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INTRODUCTION

On July 31, 1789, the United States Congress, exercising its authority
under the new and untested Constitution,1 created the United States
Customs Service to regulate the collection of duties on goods and merchandise imported into the United States.' While retaining this regulatory and revenue raising function, the responsibility of the Customs Service has expanded greatly over the last two hundred years.' Recognized
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1.
2. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24. This was the second law passed by the first
Congress. In order to realize the revenue raising goals of the Act, Congress subsequently
passed the Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, establishing the Customs Service. The
revenue raised under the Act is substantial. In 1987, for instance, Customs collected over
$14.8 billion in duties. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, CUSTOMS U.S.A.: FISCAL YEAR 1987,
at 40 [hereinafter CUSTOMS U.S.A.].
3.

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, MISSION AND ORGANIZATION 3 (July 1988) (the Cus-

toms Service enforces over 400 laws and regulations) [hereinafter MISSION]; see, e.g.,
Foreign Trade Zones, 19 U.S.C. § 81a-u (protection of revenue and admission of foreign
merchandise into customs territory); Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303385
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today as the principal border enforcement agency,4 the Customs Service
is primarily concerned with regulating carriers and persons entering and
departing United States ports, enforcing auto safety and emission standards, protecting United States business and labor by enforcing trademark and copyright regulations, coordinating efforts with various federal
agencies to prevent the flow of child pornography, and protecting the
public and environment from hazardous products.' Most important,
however, the Customs Service is responsible for the detection and prevention of the smuggling of narcotics and contraband into the United
States.' Congress has given the Customs Service the means to fulfill these
responsibilities by empowering it not only to search individuals and carriers at United States ports and borders, 7 but also to seize and detain

51 (1982) (levying of duties on goods); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§
2501-82 (1982) (antidumping duties).
4. MISSION, supra note 3, at 3.
5. See, e.g., CUSTOMS U.S.A., supra note 2, at 3. As an example of the far-reaching
responsibilities of the Customs Service, a 1987 Customs undercover operation tracked an
illegal shipment of spare missile parts valued at $250,000 through Europe and the Far
East to Iran. Id. at 12. The defendant, Arif Surrani, unsuccessfully tried to link the
shipment to the "Irangate" scandal. Id.
6. For an overview of various inspection, control, and enforcement programs, see
CUSTOMS U.S.A., supra note 2, at 4-12; see also U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1982-1988 at 1-10 [hereinafter ACCOMPLISHMENTS].
7. The relevant provision states:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at
any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be
authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act. . . , or at any other authorized place without as well as within his
district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person,
trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or
vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982); see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (1988) (searches of baggage and
merchandise).
Customs agents have the authority to conduct these searches without probable cause
and without a warrant. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (searches are
reasonable and do not violate the fourth amendment); see also United States v. One (1)
1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 625 F. Supp. 893, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1986),
af'd, 858 F.2d 643 (1988). For a general discussion on Customs searches of international mail, see Note, Customs Inspectors and InternationalMail: To Open or Not to
Open?, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 773 (1988). For a look at intrusive border searches,
see Note, Intrusive Border Searches: What Protection Remains for the International
Traveler Entering the United States after United States v. Montoya de Hernandez and
Its Progeny?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1987).
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goods from those suspected of violating United States customs laws.' In
1987, the Customs Service seized over $740 billion in connection with
alleged violations of the customs laws, in addition to narcotics and dangerous drugs valued at over $8.7 billion.9
Property carried over the border and commercial goods shipped from
abroad may be damaged during these searches and seizures. Property
may also be damaged during customs detention pending an administrative or judicial decision. 10 The owners of the seized property may also
suffer some minor economic loss as a result of being deprived of the use
of their property. However, when seizure, inspection," and detention results in excessive delays in returning the property 12 or when the goods
are negligently damaged,1" destroyed, 1 ' or lost, the owner may incur a

8. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1982) (authorizing seizures of vessels or vehicles to
force payment of penalties); 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (1982) (authorizing seizure of property
used to facilitate the illegal importation of other goods); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982) (civil
forfeiture applicable to goods imported contrary to law).
9. CUSTOMS U.S.A., supra note 2, at 39-40.
10. See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL, BETTER CARE AND DISPOSAL OF
SEIZED CARS, BOATS, AND

PLANES SHOULD SAVE MONEY AND BENEFIT LAW EN-

FORCEMENT (July 1983) (report to the Chairman and House Comm. on Government
Operations) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The GAO Report focuses on how the lack of
care and maintenance of seized property devalues the property for the rightful owner and
results in decreased sales returns for the Government. Id. at 22. The report observed that
"batteries die, engines freeze, seals shrink, and leak oil, salt, air and water corrode metal
surfaces, barnacles accumulate on hulls, small animals and birds build nests in aircraft
wings, unvented windows crack from heat." Id. at 20, 20-22. Among other things, the
GAO recommended that Congress establish a "special fund" from which proceeds could
be used to maintain and protect the goods. As a response, Congress created the Customs
Forfeiture Fund, now codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1613(b) (1982). See U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, SEIZED PROPERTY HANDBOOK ii (1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The original
fund was established as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 2054. This part of the Act was repealed by The Tax Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2925 (1986) and recreated by Pub. L. No. 100-71,
101 Stat. 438 (1987).
11. 19 C.F.R. § 151.1 (1988) provides: "The district director shall examine such
packages or quantities of merchandise as he deems necessary for the determination of
duties and for compliance with the Customs laws and any other laws enforced by the
Customs Service."
12. See, e.g., Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973) (nine month delay between Customs inspection and filing of forfeiture for antique jewelry).
13. See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984) (antiques and art objects
damaged).
14. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 1 (1986)
(small holes drilled into imported furniture).
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substantial and unexpected loss. 5 Despite these economic hardships,
neither the courts nor the Government has provided the victims of damaged property with an adequate equitable remedy.
This Note explores the availability of adequate property damage remedies following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kosak v.
United States, denying property owners the right to recover under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)."6 The Note also proposes several alternative remedies, including judicial adjustments to claims brought
under the Tucker Act' 7 and fifth amendment "takings" clause,, tort
claims against individual customs officials, and legislative adjustments to
the administrative settlement process under the Small Claims Act."9 Part
II of this Note traces the judicial treatment of property damage claims
brought against the United States Government under the FTCA, as well
as constitutional and contractual sources of relief under the Tucker Act.
In addition, Part II explores tort claims against customs officials in their
individual capacities. Part III briefly discusses the right of a claimant to
petition Congress for private relief legislation. Part IV examines administrative relief through remission and mitigation procedures as well as
settlement opportunities under the Small Claims Act. Finally, Part V
concludes that the judiciary may make recovery available under an "ad
hoc" plaintiff-oriented approach to the fifth amendment "takings"
clause. The judiciary could also provide a remedy by relaxing proof standards in Bivens actions against customs officials individually. Yet, the
better solution to the current lack of adequate remedies would be a legislative increase in the funds available to injured plaintiffs and tightened
procedures for administrative settlement under the Small Claims Act.
II.
A.

JUDICIAL RELIEF

Recovery Under the Federal Tort Claims Act

Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred recovery
against the federal government to those who had been injured or suffered
loss at the hands of government employees.20 To reduce the sometimes
15. See, e.g., Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958)
(309 lbs. of English woolens missing); A & D Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (five packets of gemstones missing from brief case).
16. 465 U.S. 848 (1984).
17. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 905 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982)).
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
19. Ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066 (1922) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3723 (1982)).
20. The concept of sovereign immunity apparently originated from the maxim "the
King can do no wrong." Though the expression originally connoted only that the king
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harsh consequences suffered by those injured by the tortious conduct of
government employees,21 Congress provided individuals with relief
through enactment of private bills.22 This congressional relief legislation
was frequently criticized for being time consuming, exceeding the scope
of legislative duties, and failing to provide adequate relief.2" The failure
of this system to address tort claims effectively eventually led to the erosion of sovereign immunity through the passage of several acts, beginning with the Tucker Act of 1887,24 which provides that the Govern-

was not privileged to do wrong, the phrase has been interpreted to mean that the king
was incapable of doing wrong. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1,
2 & n.2 (1924). See generally Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration,5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952).
Several policy arguments support the doctrine of sovereign immunity. These arguments include: (1) that public funds should not be used to compensate private injuries;
(2) that public service and safety would be hindered, and resources wasted, if the Government were burdened with excessive claims; (3) that a waiver to liability could expose
the Government to endless embarrassment; and (4) that, unlike private enterprise, the
Government derives no profit from its activities. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610, 614-15 (1955). For an explanation and counter attack to these arguments, see id.; see also Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1977). Bermann poses
several good arguments for a system of exclusive governmental liability by analyzing
several state codes. Id. at 1194.
21. See Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 828, 846-48 (advocating the abrogation of sovereign immunity). Criticism of sovereign immunity centers around the notion that it is unfair to allow recovery
to individuals injured by government employees when the same individuals, suffering the
same injury in similar circumstances, could recover against a private employer. See, e.g.,
Note, Governmental Liabilityfor Customs Officials' Negligence: Kosak v. United States,
67 MINN. L. REV. 1040 (1983) (suggesting this injustice is worked as a result of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1982) to preclude claims based
on customs officials' negligence in handling property in their possession).
22. These bills, sometimes referred to as "special legislation," were enacted to provide specific relief to individuals injured by governmental employees. Note, supra, note
21, at 1042. For a complete discussion of congressional relief through private legislation,
see infra, Part III.
23. "Congress is poorly equipped to serve as a judicial tribunal for the settlement of
private claims against the Government of the United States." REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS PURSUANT TO H. CON. RES. 18, S. REP.
No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 (1946), H. REP. No. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 25
(1946); see Mikva, supra note 21, at 839; Note, Using the Federal Tort Claims Act to
Remedy Property Damage Following Customs Service Seizures, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
83, 85-86 & n.21 (1983) (inefficiencies of the private legislation method included the
changing of congressional membership, the inadequate weighing of the merits of each
case, investigative burdens, and political pressures, often leading to inconsistent results).
24. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 905 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982)).
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ment is liable for claims "not sounding in tort," and culminating with
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Title IV of which is the
FTCA.2 5
In general, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity in certain situations
in which private persons committing the same act would be liable.26 Section 1346(b), for example, grants jurisdiction to the district courts "for
injury or loss of property ...

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment. '2 7 However, section 2680 provides
thirteen exceptions to the FTCA's broad waiver of sovereign immunity.2"
The Government's retention of its immunity under one of these exceptions deprives the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim.2" Referred to by some as the "customs" or "detention" exception, 0 section 2680(c) states that the waiver of governmental immunity
shall not apply to "[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-en-

Section 1346(a)(2) gives the district courts original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court
of Claims, for actions not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491, also gives the Court of
Claims, jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States, "founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
25. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671-80 (1982)).
26. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances. . .
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1982). These sections except from the general waiver of
immunity claims such as: the loss or negligent transmission of mail; establishment of a
quarantine by the United States; activities of the Panama Canal and Tennessee Valley
Authority; fiscal operations of the Treasury; and "assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Id.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982) ("The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
this title shall not apply to" the thirteen listed exceptions.); see also Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1081 (1986).
30. Comment, Section 2680(c) of the FTCA Bars Claims Against the United States
for Negligent Damage to Property While in the Custody of Customs Service; Kosak v.
United States , 28 VILL. L. REv. 835, 838 n.22 (1983) (referring to the section as the
"customs exception"); see 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 256, at
13-5 (1983) (breaking down the claims under section 2680(c) to those relating to the
"detention" of goods and those relating to the assessment and collection of goods).
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forcement officer."

31

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kosak v. United States,32
considerable controversy surrounded the interpretation of the "customs
exception." 3 Simply put, the question was whether section 2680(c)
barred only those claims for consequential damages due to the wrongful
seizure and detention of goods by the Customs Service or whether, in
addition, section 2680(c) also barred claims for property loss or damage
3
due to the mishandling and carelessness of customs officials. '
Tort claims based upon wrongful seizure and detention often arise after the customs authorities seize dominion or control over goods for violations of customs laws. 5 Claimants bringing these actions usually demand
both the return of property confiscated during the alleged wrongful
seizure and money damages for injury caused by the detention of the
goods.3 6 Although the owner may raise the issue of the wrongful seizure

31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1982). The discussion of the section 2680(c) exception in
connection with other federal agencies appears in this Note for purposes of analogy.
Customs cases discussing this narrow issue are few and the other agency cases are instructional. See infra note 35.
32. 465 U.S. 848 (1984).
33. 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 256.03, at 13-17; Note, supra note 23, at 87.
34. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 256.03, at 13-17. Section 2680(c) has also
been used to bar claims focusing on the improper and wrongful means of assessing and
collecting taxes or duties. For instance, the Fifth Circuit recently held section 2680(c)
barred a conversion claim by a bank against the IRS. Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v.
United States, 769 F.2d 299, 306-08 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
The bank had alleged that the IRS, in collection of delinquent taxes from a taxpayer,
wrongfully levied upon accounts receivable of the taxpayer in which the bank had a
perfected secured interest. The court held that in order for the bank to prevail it must
"overcome a formidable obstacle" in section 2680(c), which exempts from the waiver of
immunity "any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax." Id. at
306 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)) (emphasis added).
35. United States v. One (1) 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 625 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (seizure of vessel by Customs officials and Coast Guard);
United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327
(5th Cir. 1974) (seizure of a boat for transporting marijuana); cf.United States v. 2,116
Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. JarboeLackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 1068 (1984) (seizure of adulterated
meat); United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979) (alleged
negligent seizure of an aircraft by FAA for violations of safety regulations).
36. Detention damages typically include depreciation, decline in market value, and
loss of use. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 852 (1984); see, e.g., Custom Boat,
501 F.2d at 1330; cf. Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of the Treasury
Dep't of the United States, 530 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1976) (owner of automobile seized by
Treasury agents for allegedly containing a destructive device brought action for damages
and return of the vehicle).
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at the judicial forfeiture hearing as an affirmative defense, 37 courts have
repeatedly denied separate counterclaims for damages by applying the
language of section 2680(c). 38 For instance, in United States v. One (1)
1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, Fl 8443AY,39 the Customs Service
refused to remit a boat seized for transporting marijuana until the concededly innocent owner had paid storage charges for the boat.40 After

37. Castleberry, 530 F.2d at 675 ("[Tlhe proper place to litigate the legality of the
seizure of the automobile is in the forfeiture proceeding and not elsewhere."); Custom
Boat, 501 F.2d at 1330; Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 396.
Judicial forfeiture proceedings are brought as in rem actions against the property.
Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 393; Barracuda,625 F. Supp. at 897. The Government's action,
in this context, is both "a claim of forfeiture and an assertion of ownership." Hatzlachh
Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 467 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 258 (S.D. Ga. 1977). Generally, seizure
procedures are governed by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-18 (1982). See generally Note, supra
note 23, at 83 n.5. Under the provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982), the Government
must establish that the seizing officer had probable cause to take custody of the property.
In Custom Boat, for example, the court held that the arresting officer had satisfied the
Government's burden when he had "detected the odor of marijuana in the boat" and the
substance seized from the boat tested positive for marijuana. 501 F.2d at 1329. The
burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that the property should not be forfeited. If
the claimant cannot satisfy its burden, the property is forfeited.
A claimant can avoid forfeiture by asserting the "innocent-owner" defense. Barracuda, 625 F. Supp. at 898-99. To succeed, a claimant must prove by the preponderance
of the evidence that "1) they were not involved in the wrongful activity, 2) they were not
aware of the wrongful activity, and 3) they had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of their property." Id. at 898; see also CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-90 (1974) (suggesting the possibility of the defense). See generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 171.11-.15 (1988) (filing procedures). Upon the establishment of the defense, payment of a penalty, or remission, the
property is usually returned. See Hatzlachh, 444 U.S. at 461; Lockheed, 656 F.2d at
393. But see Barracuda, 625 F. Supp. at 900-01 (despite the innocent owner defense,
the court could not deny forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1707 (1982)).
On the other hand, if the court does not uphold the forfeiture, the Government has an
implied duty at law to return the goods to the owner. Hatzlachh, 444 U.S. at 467
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1982).
38. Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 397 (barring counterclaim for negligent seizure of the
aircraft); cf. United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 125 F. Supp. 661, 663
(ED, Mo. 1954) (barring counterclaim for damages for illegal seizure of auto used in a
"policy" racket). But see United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d
1372, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that counterclaim would have been allowed
if proper procedures were followed).
39. 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added). The owner had rented the boat to a third party
who was arrested after a Customs' investigation uncovered five burlap bags of marijuana
on the boat. Id.
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the owner refused to pay the storage charges, the Government instituted
forfeiture proceedings. The trial court ordered the boat to be forfeited to
the United States and at the same time denied the owner his counterclaim for damage to the boat and loss of the boat's service while it was
being stored. In affirming the lower court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that section 2680(c) "specifically prohibits the bringing of any claim arising from the detention of any goods
or merchandise by a customs officer." '41
The traditional justification for denying recovery for damage alleged
in wrongful seizure and detention claims under section 2680(c) rests
upon the theory that there are "adequate alternative remedies" available
to such wronged claimants.42 Originally, this rationale appeared directed
solely towards tax revenue claims.43 Courts, however, subsequently ap-

41. Id. at 1330 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower
court's denial of a counterclaim for recoupment of money damages for the'diminished
value of property during detention. United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d
1481 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom Jarboe-Lackey Feedlot&, Inc. v. United
States, 469 U.S. 1068 (1984). In this case, a condemnation action was brought by the
Government pursuant to the Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1982), alleging
adulteration of certain beef owned by the claimant. Id. at 1483. Despite finding that the
Government failed to prove adulteration, the court held that the claimant's counterclaim
was barred by section 2680(c). The court rejected claimant's reasoning that the denial of
forfeiture by the court, resulting in the return of the property, also carried an implied
authority to compensate the claimant for such property's depreciated value. Id. at 149091. But cf United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1973) (concluding that the lower court had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), both to declare the forfeiture void and to order that the claimant be
paid proceeds from the sale of his automobile as well as depreciation on it from the time
of seizure to time of sale).
42. 2 L. JAYsoN, supra note 30, § 256.01, at 13-8; Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 45 (1946); Note, supra note
23, at 93.
43. See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearing on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940) (testimony
of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General):
The ... exception relates to claims arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by
any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer. There are
various tax laws providing the machinery for recovering back any tax that has
been paid but was not properly owing. There was no purpose in interfering with
that machinery.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982) (taxpayer can bring suit against the Government
"for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected").
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plied this rationale to other seizure cases." In most wrongful seizure and
detention cases, it appears that the adequate "alternative remedy" takes
one of two forms. Initially, it was argued that the FTCA should not
waive governmental immunity in wrongful seizure claims because the
judicial forfeiture process already gives the claimant an existing remedy.4 5 In recent years, however, courts have also held that if the claimant
prevails on the merits of the forfeiture, he may bring suit against the
United States for monetary damages under the Tucker Act. 46 Recently,
the same "adequate alternative remedy" theory has also provided part of
the justification for denying claims for property loss or damage under
section 2680(c).
In Kosak v. United States, the Supreme Court invoked both a literal
interpretation and the brief legislative history of section 2680(c) in holding that this section precludes recovery against the United States for alleged injuries to property caused by the negligence of customs officials.47
The holding clearly rejected a line of cases which implied that section
2680(c) barred only claims for consequential damage suffered during a
wrongful seizure and detention.
The two principle arguments rejected by the Supreme Court arose
from the Second Circuit's decision in Alliance Assurance Co. v. United
States. 8 In Alliance, an insurer and subrogee of the owner of imported
goods brought suit against the United States under both the Tucker

44. See, e.g., Newstead v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (remedy
for seizure of claimant's gun by Treasury agents potentially recoverable administratively
under 26 U.S.C. § 7325).
45. See supra note 37; Note, supra note 23, at 93.
46. See Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of the Treasury Dep't of
the United States, 530 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1973). The adequacy of this remedy
remains questionable. Should the Government decide to forego the forfeiture process, the
claimant conceivably has no way to challenge the legality of the seizure. See Note, supra
note 23, at 88 n.30.
47. 465 U.S. 848 (1984). In Kosak, the petitioners' art collection was seized by the
Customs Service for alleged smuggling violations. After the petitioner was acquitted, the
goods were returned to him pursuant to a petition filed for relief from forfeiture. Petitioner then filed an administrative complaint alleging that the goods had been damaged
while in possession of the Customs Service. In affirming the district court, the Third
Circuit held that section 2680(c) fails to provide a clear relinquishment of governmental
immunity from property damage suits. Thus, the court concluded section 2680(c) shields
the Government from "all claims arising out of the detention of goods by customs officers
and does not purport to distinguish among types of harm." 679 F.2d 306, 308 (3d Cir.
1982), quoted in Kosak, 465 U.S. at 851.
48. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Act,49 (for breach of an implied contract of bailment) and the FTCA (for
value of English woolens lost while in possession of the Customs Service). The Second Circuit gave two principal reasons for rejecting the
Government's argument that section 2680(c) prohibits both wrongful
seizure and property damage claims. First, the court examined prior
holdings under the exception and concluded that section 2680(c) is normally used only to preclude actions based upon wrongful seizures.5" Second, the court reasoned that if Congress had intended to bar actions
based on the negligent handling of goods, it would have specifically
stated this.5" The court reached this conclusion by comparing the language in section 2680(c) with the language in section 2680(b), which
bars claims "arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail by the Postal Service.52 Thus, the court reasoned, if Congress had wished to bar negligent actions with respect to customs officials, it would have used similar language in section 2680(c). 3
Writing for the Court in Kosak, Justice Marshall clearly rejected the
rationale of Alliance, stating that the contrast between the language in
section 2680(b) and in section 2680(c) merely suggests, "if anything, that

49. The application and importance of the Tucker Act in Alliance is explored more
completely below. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
50. Alliance, 252 F.2d at 534 (citing Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139
F. Supp. 38, 39 (D. Md. 1956) and United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe de Ville,
125 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Mo. 1954)).

51. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1982).
53. Alliance, 252 F.2d at 534. Several courts subsequently embraced the Alliance
interpretation. In A-Mark v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978),
appellant sought recovery from the Government under the FTCA for damage to a "brilliant, uncirculated and semi-prooflike" coin entrusted to treasury officials for authentication. Following Alliance, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the appellant that section
2680(c) "reaches only those claims asserting injury as a result of the fact of detention
itself where the propriety of the detention is at issue, and does not reach claims where
the injury is asserted to result from negligent handling of property in the course of detention." Id. at 850. The Fifth Circuit in A & D Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669,
673 (5th Cir. 1982), also held that the section 2680(c) exception does not cover claims
"alleging carelessness in the handling of... property." A & D Int'l involved an action
against the Customs Service and a brokerage firm to recover the loss of gemstones. Id. at
670. The court distinguished this case from its earlier holding in United States v. One
(1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
Accordingly, the court held that A & D Int'l involved a claim for negligent handling of
property whereas the claim in Custom Boat was one relating to the incidents or detention of the wrongful seizure, "clearly the type of suit which is excepted by 28 U.S.C. §
2680(c)." Id.
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Congress intended the former to be less encompassing than the latter."5 4
Instead, Justice Marshall adopted the theory urged by some lower
courts55 that the plain and ordinary language of section 2680(c) fails to
distinguish claims for wrongful seizures from those for property damage.5 To Justice Marshall and these courts, absent clear congressional
intent to the contrary, section 2680(c) must bar both types of claims.
Consequently, these courts have prohibited claims against the Government for the negligence of its employees in the handling of a cargo of
canned tomatoes,5" in the storage of a plane used to smuggle marijuana,5 8 and in the failure to prevent the theft and vandalization of

54. 465 U.S. at 855 (in original emphasis). Contra Kosak, 679 F.2d at 309, (Weiss,
J., dissenting). Judge Weiss, in comparing the language of section 2680(c) with other
FTCA exceptions, read the phrase "in respect of" as the equivalent of "as regards" to
infer that "the statutory exception is directed to the fact of detention itself" and not to
property damage claims. Id. at 310. But see Note, supra note 23, at 89 & n.40 (rejecting
Weiss' argument on the ground that evidence supports a finding that the language difference was purely unintentional).
55. See 465 U.S. at 855; see, e.g., Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d
617, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Congress specifically and explicitly rejected any tort liability for
any claim arising with respect to a customs detention); S. Schonfeld Co. v. SS Akra
Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (D.S.C. 1973) ("[T]here is nothing in the language
of the statute to indicate that erroneous seizure in the inception should be distinguished
from improper retention or negligent handling of goods properly seized at the outset.").
56, The Supreme Court had its first opportunity to solve the dispute over the scope
of section 2680(c) in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (per
curiam), but it declined to settle the issue. In Hatzlachh, the Court was faced with the
question of whether section 2680(c) precluded a claim under the Tucker Act for breach
of an implied contract of bailment. Petitioners' imported camera supplies were seized by
the Customs Service and forfeited for customs violations. After the petitioners paid a
$40,000 penalty, the goods were returned, but more than $165,000 worth of equipment
allegedly was missing. Id. at 461. The Court of Claims earlier held that because section
2680(c) would prevent this loss from being recoverable under a tort claim, it would be "a
trespass on congressional prerogatives for this court now to hold that, by seizing subject
to forfeiture certain merchandise, the Government assented to, or agreed to be bound by,
an implied-in-fact contract to return the merchandise whole." 579 F.2d at 621. Accordingly, the Court of Claims denied recovery under the petitioner's theory.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that section 2680(c)
does not omit or otherwise affect immunity waivers contained in the Tucker Act. 444
U.S. at 462-63. The Court also rejected the United States argument that the contractual
remedy should be rejected because individual officers are subject to personal liability and
because 28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1982) provides that the judgment will be paid by the United
States upon showing of probable cause for the seizure. Id. at 465-66. For more on section
2006 and individual tort liability, see infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
57. Schonfeld, 363 F. Supp. 1220.
58. United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir.
1981).
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equipment on a vessel seized for violations of immigration laws. 9
Justice Marshall's opinion also cited the three major rationales for the
enumerated exceptions as direct support for the Court's holding that
Congress never intended to waive immunity from suits alleging damage
to detained property: (1) the threat of disruptive damage suits; (2) the
avoidance of the Government's exposure to fraudulent claims; and (3)
the availability of adequate alternative remedies.6 0 According to Justice
Marshall, the fear that numerous damage suits could stagnate Customs
Service enforcement, coupled with the fact that inadequate monitoring
systems could encourage fraudulent claims, led Congress to decide not to
relinquish immunity." Moreover, Justice Marshall reasoned that the evidentiary requirements associated with negligence suits against officials
and suits brought under the Tucker Act by way of an implied contract of
bailment helped to reduce the potential for fraudulent claims and to provide the claimant with an adequate alternative remedy. 2
Justice Stevens' dissent argued that the majority's focus on the legislative history and purposes of the FTCA were misplaced. 6 3 First, he attacked the Court's reliance on the views of one of the original drafters of
section 2680(c) for support of the FTCA's legislative history." Next, he
criticized the majority's focus on the "general purposes" for creating the
exceptions in the FTCA. Justice Stevens argued that the focus, if any,
should be on the general purpose of the Act, which was to cure the inadequacies of the existing remedies. 65 Furthermore, he answered the
Court's concerns about administrative burdens and fraudulent claims by
stating that these arguments are "properly addressed to Congress, not to
' 68
this Court.
The Supreme Court's holding in Kosak foreclosed the imposition of

59. Romanach v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 1017 (D.P.R. 1984).
60. 465 U.S. at 858.
61. Id. at 859-60
62.

Id. at 860-62. Justice Marshall felt that the requirement that an owner of dam-

aged property prove the existence of an implied-in-fact contract helped "screen out"
fraudulent claims. Similarly, he argued that the burden on the owner to prove negligence

on the part of an official, combined with the indemnity provisions of section 2006, both
in themselves deterrents to enforcement by the Customs Service, may have also deterred

Congress from extending the owner a remedy under the FTCA. Id. at 861-62 n.24.
63. Id. at 862-69.
64. Justice Stevens claims that there was no evidence supporting congressional reliance on the "Holtzoff Report." Id. at 863-64. Apparently Judge Alexander Holtzoff was

one of the principal proponents of the FTCA and the first to draft section 2680(c). Id. at
856.
65.

Id. at 865-66.

66. Id. at 869.
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governmental liability under section 2680(c), recognizing that claimants
may be denied an effective remedy for all types of detention-related
property damage. 7 Expanding on this notion, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in two recent cases that the section
2680(c) exception will apply even when there is no other judicial or ad68
ministrative remedy.
Since Kosak, courts have broadened the scope of section 2680(c) under
the "incidents of detention." In Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United
States, 9 the Second Circuit held that the "destruction" of a car detained
by Drug Enforcement Administration agents was sufficiently akin to the
"detention" of goods to preclude recovery under section 2680(C). 7 ' This
holding could be logically extended to also exclude claims for goods damaged while searched at the border. Though the officers technically "detain" the goods momentarily, the conduct of the officers is arguably "sufficiently akin to the functions carried out by Customs officials to place
the agents' conduct within the scope of section 2680(c). ' 171 The exception
has even barred a claim for damages when the Customs Service, after
storing the goods for over a year, sold the claimant's goods at a public
auction without giving the required notice to the importer.7 2
Nonetheless, it may be premature to conclude that the Kosak holding,
in effect, denies claimants any recourse. The Tucker Act provides two

67. Id. at 862.
68. Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299, 307-08 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); Solus Ocean Systems, Inc. v. United States

Customs Service, 777 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985).
70. While searching a $66,000, 1971 Mercedes Benz convertible for narcotics, agents
of the Drug Enforcement Administration, "allegedly disassembled the car so completely
and damaged so many parts as to render the vehicle effectively destroyed." Id. at 823. No
drugs were found. Id. at 824.
71. Id. at 824. The argument was raised in the Government's brief in Kosak. A cork
pagoda was broken during a search of Kosak's home pursuant to a valid warrant. Counsel for the United States argued that although the pagaoda was broken during the search
to see what items fell within the warrant, the item was "detained" for purposes of section
2680(c). Brief for the United States, Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), (No.
82-618) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File). The Supreme Court did not
address this specific situation. Yet, there is nothing in the language of section 2680(c)
that suggests negligence at the border should be treated differently then negligence during the search of a commercial shipment detained by Customs. See id.
72. Solus, 777 F.2d at 327. Notice is required to be given to the importer thirty days
prior to the date of sale under 19 C.F.R. § 127.24 (1988). The court recognized the
Customs Service's power to sell goods in order to pay for storage costs. However, the
court also recognized that its holding implied that there was no private right of action to
force the Customs Service to follow their own regulations. 777 F.2d at 328.
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possible avenues of recoyery. Kosak did not alter the Court's earlier
opinion in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, which left open the
possibility of a recovery under the Tucker Act if the owner of the detained property can establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract
of bailment with the Customs Service.73 Furthermore, a fifth amendment
suit based upon either an "unconstitutional taking" or deprivation of
property without "due process" may exist either independently or under
the Tucker Act, provided that the claimant can prove the unlawful nature of the seizure. 7 ' Additionally, a Bivens or common law remedy may
be available against an individual customs official if the plaintiff can
prove egregious conduct by the particular official in the handling of the
goods.7 5 This Note next analyzes recent attempts to recover under these
theories in an effort to discover whether Kosak and its progeny have
indeed foreclosed any possibility of judicial relief for detention-related
property damage.
B.

Recovery Under the Tucker Act

The Tucker Act, which permits claims against the Unixed' States
"founded either upon the Constitution . . . or upon any express or implied contract with the United States," 76 may arguably offerclaimants
two potential avenues of relief for detention-related property damage.
Because the Tucker Act is jurisdictional only, claimants must assert a
substantive right enforceable against the United States. After their
claims for detention-related and negligent property damage were denied
in forfeiture proceedings,7 several property owners have attempted to
obtain relief "founded upon the Constitution" under either the compensable taking 9 or due process"0 clauses of the fifth amendment.8 " Alternatively, owners of damaged property have tried to prevail under an "implied" contractual theory. Essentially derived from the holdings in

73. 444 U.S. 460 (1980); see supra note 56.
74. See infra Part II, B, 1.
75. See Kosak, 465 U.S. 848, 860-61 & n.24.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1982).
77. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
78. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
79. The fifth amendment provides that "no person shall ...[have] private property.
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
80. The fifth amendment also provides in pertinent part that, "no person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.

V.
81. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of the Treasury
Dep't of the United States, 530 F.2d 672, 677 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Alliance and Hatzlachh, these claims assert an implied contract of bailment with the Government which permits recovery for breach of contract
when the Government damages or fails to return the goods.82
1. The Fifth Amendment: Claims Founded
Upon the Constitution
Parties generally bring actions based on "takings" of property against
the Government pursuant to the fifth amendment which provides that
private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation.""s Traditionally, the enforcement of "regulations which were enacted in good faith, and had appropriate and direct connection with that
protection to life, health, and property which each State owes to her
citizens," has not constituted a compensable taking."' Courts view regulatory enforcement as a noncompensable exercise of the Government's
police power, distinguishable from a taking of property for the benefit of
public use.8 5 Consequently, courts have denied recovery under a "taking" theory in order to further the Government's regulatory enforcement
prerogative." The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a forfeiture statute that authorized the "taking" of private property without
just compensation."' As a matter of principle, the Court stated that for-

82. See infra notes 138-93 and accompanying text.
83, See Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L.
R v. 827, 876 (1956). Originally, there was considerable controversy surrounding
whether or not the phrase "founded upon the Constitution" provided an independent
substantive right based on constitutional guaranties or whether the claim for a "taking"
needed to be in the form of a contract right for purposes of jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act. See generally id. at 876-81; Silberman v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 895 (D. Mass.
1947) (finding an "implied" promise to pay for the taking). Recent cases seem to suggest
that a claimant may proceed directly under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., LaChance v.
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 127 (1988).
84, Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329, 338-39 (1985) (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Meserey v. United States, 447 F. Supp 548 (D. Nev. 1977). In
Meserey, the court denied recovery to a claimant for detention of homeopathic drugs
under the authority of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The court held that
Congress had the power "to determine what articles of merchandise may be imported
into this country and terms upon which a right to import may be exercised." Id. at 553
(quoting Sugarman v. Forbragd, 267 F. Supp. 817, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aJ/'d, 405
F.2d 1189, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969)). The claimant was told that he could
either export the articles to the country of origin or have them destroyed. Id. at 554.
87. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In upholding
a Puerto Rican statute that provided for seizure without notice and forfeiture of vessels
involved in transporting contraband, the Court stated: "Forfeiture of conveyances that
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feiture process helps further the deterrence purpose of underlying criminal statutes.8" Subsequent courts have denied "taking" claims for money
damages where camera supplies were seized for suspected violations of
customs laws,8 9 where potentially adulterated beef was seized pursuant
to a condemnation action,90 and where a boat was forfeited after being
used to transport controlled substances. 91 A recent Court of Claims decision rejected a traveler's just compensation claim for return of $49,000
seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency. The court held that when the
seizure and forfeiture are in the course of normal regulatory procedures,
no compensable "taking" has occurred. 2 The fact that the owner may be
93
innocent of any wrongdoing seems to have little effect on the outcome.
State court "takings" decisions support the result reached in these
cases. Several states have rejected the theory that damages flowing from
an intentional regulatory practice constitute a "taking" for public use.94
These courts hold that lawsuits for "takings" based on unintentional actions of state employees during the course of regulatory enforcement are
merely negligence suits against officials for which a waiver of sovereign
have been used-and may be used again-in violation of narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of
the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior
unprofitable." Id. at 686-87.
88. Id. "A forfeiture is clearly a penalty for a criminal offense." Jaekel v. United
States, 304 F. Supp. 993, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (quoting Compton v. United States, 377
F.2d 408, 411 (8th Cir. 1967)).
89. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d 617, 619 (Cl. Ct. 1978).
90. Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, 7 C1. Ct. at 339.
91. United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501
F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
92. LaChance v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 127 (1988) (plaintiff exhausted all available administrative attempts to have the money returned).
93. See Note, supra note 23, at 87 n.29 (discussing the implications of the "innocent
owner" defense); Simons v. United States 497 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting
the "innocent owner" defense); Custom Boat, 501 F.2d at 1329 (refusing to remit the
boat to the "innocent" owner until storage charges paid); cf. Annotation, Seizure of
Property as Evidence in Criminal Prosecution on Investigation as Compensable Taking, 44 A.L.R. 4th 366 (1986) (innocent owners of property seized for criminal evidence
have a "public duty" to provide evidence regardless of the financial burden). But see
United States v. One (1) 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 625 F. Supp. 893
(S.D. Fla. 1986).
94. See, e.g., McNeil v. Montague, 124 Cal. App. 2d 325, 268 P.2d 497 (1954)
(damage caused by fire spreading plan not property taken for public use); Angelle v.
State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948) (unintentional destruction resulting from state
department of agriculture spraying plan not compensable taking); Rogers v. Tattnall
County, 29 Ga. App. 779, 116 S.E. 545 (1923) (negligence of officer causing death of
cattle).
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immunity is necessary. ° 5
A more plaintiff-oriented approach to Supreme Court compensable
takings cases may alter this result. Recent Supreme Court cases have
relied on "ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case" in determining whether a compensable "taking" has occurred
under the fifth amendment." Although this analysis is admittedly ad
hoc, the Supreme Court has generally identified two specific areas of
97
inquiry.
First, courts should look at the character of the government's action.98
They determine whether the government activity is pursuant to a justifiable regulatory program or whether it is an unintended physical invasion
of the owner's property.99 Second, courts should analyze the economic
impact of the government action on the owner's property. A factor considered under this inquiry is any reduction in property value from either
permanent or temporary government use. 0 0 In particular, courts should
look at the "investment-backed expectation" of the owner. 01 A closer
look at these standards may reveal an avenue of relief for owners of
property damaged or lost while in the custody of the Customs Service.
The Supreme Court has traditionally drawn a distinction in its "takings" analysis between government activity that is more akin to a physical invasion and acts taken pursuant to a regulatory program. In general, it may not constitute a compensable "taking" where the
Government acts to protect the health and safety of the public." 2 For
example, the Government may destroy infectious trees 0 3 or condemn
structures.1 0 4 On the other hand, certain government actions or a combination of actions, even without intention, may "entail such an actual in-

95. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 74 N.W. 111 (1898); see supra note 94.
96. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986).
97. The Court in Connolly actually mentioned three factors. For purposes of analysis herein, the economic impact and interference with investment back expectations are
treated as one. See generally Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes
"Taking," Within the Meaning of Fifth Amendment's Prohibition Against Taking of
Private Propertyfor Public Use Without Just Compensation, 89 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1988).
98. Connolly, 106 S.Ct. at 1026; Annotation, supra note 97, at 984.
99. Connolly, 106 S.Ct. at 1026; Annotation, supra note 97, at 984; see infra note
105 and accompanying text.
100. See Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329, 338 (1985)
(listing cases supporting temporary government "takings").
101. Connolly, 106 S.Ct. at 1027.
102. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2391 n.4 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
104. First English, 107 S.Ct. at 2391 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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vasion of private property rights that a constitutional taking must be implied."' 0 5 Destruction of fixtures and equipment in a temporary taking
of a building,' 0 6 and damage and destruction to buildings surrounded by
a Navy gunnery" ° are examples of physical invasions.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 08 may have
effectively blurred the distinction between regulatory and physical invasion "takings" analysis. Analogizing to several physical invasions cases,
the Court held in First English that a landowner may recover damages
for a "temporary" regulatory taking. 10 9 The holding seems to suggest
that regulatory takings no longer deserve a presumption against compensation. Hence, while it is generally recognized that customs seizures are
"takings" pursuant to a regulatory policy, they may not be noncompensable takings per se, even if taken temporarily.
Under the economic impact analysis, the complete destruction or damage to the goods may also violate a standard of justice and fairness.'"
The Supreme Court has held that the unforeseen and substantial impact
of some government action may warrant the redistribution of the costs
from the individual to the public."' Arguably, the destruction of a
$66,000 automobile during a search for narcotics"' or the pilferage of
$165,000 worth of camera supplies while in the custody of the Customs
Service would meet this standard."'
105.

Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565, 567 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (combination of

government actions effectively constituted a "taking" of plaintiff's property).
106. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 384 (1945) ("destruction
is tantamount to taking").

107. Eyherabide, 345 F.2d at 567.
108. 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
109. Id. at 2387-88. Justice O'Connor's dissent illustrates this point. Id. at 2391-94.
110.

Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v.

United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
111.

Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 14.

112. Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. In Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 461 (1980), the Court
of Claims originally denied Hatzlachh's claim under the fifth amendment, citing as authority Huerta v. United States, 548 F.2d 343 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828 (1977).
In Huerta, the plaintiff alleged that salvage equipment left at a naval base had been
"pilfered" by persons on the base. Id. at 348. The court held that the facts failed to show
which persons were responsible for the damage. The dissent, on the other hand, found
merit in the plaintiff's claim. Finding that the Government had retained the materials to
its benefit and had provided inadequate efforts to protect the property, the dissent concluded that the pilferers had impliedly made the Government responsible for the loss. Id.
at 348-49. In support of this argument, it has been recognized that where the Government encroachment makes the benefit of private property available to a third party,
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Given the recent "ad hoc" approach to government takings, it would
appear that a plaintiff-oriented interpretation of the Supreme Court's
criteria could give owners of property damaged or lost while in the custody of the Customs Service a cognizable claim for a compensable "taking." In a number of cases, courts have held the damage or loss of personal property to be a substantial injury,"1 4 and have recognized the
seizure" 5 or forfeiture of personal property" 8 by the Government to be
a deprivation of the owner's domination over the property. If some of the
property returned was either damaged or missing, the Customs Service's
intentional search, seizure, and detention conceivably permanently deprives the owner of the property's use.""
Courts have also read the Tucker Act to encompass an action based
upon the fifth amendment due process clause." 8 Essentially, the claim
here is the same as that under the "takings" clause: that the Government's search, seizure," 9 or forfeiture process was unconstitutional.
Courts have recognized Tucker Act claims under the fifth amendment
for the return of fines and costs based on unconstitutional forfeitures.

rather than to itself, there are still grounds for a compensable "taking." See, e.g., Eyherabide, 345 F.2d at 570.
114. See Causby v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 768 (1948) (taking by flight easement
resulting in destruction of personal property).
115. Yokum v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 972, 974-75 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
820 (1976).
116. Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 258 (S.D. Ga. 1977).
117. Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329, 338 (1985); see
also Kessler v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 123, 124 (1983) (if the Government ceases to
hold property as a mere custodian, a "taking" may occur).
118. United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882, 886
(6th Cir. 1973). (28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) gives jurisdiction to the district courts to hear
fifth amendment claims) (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715 (1971)).
U.S. Coin & Currency held that the fifth amendment privilege may be invoked in the
forfeiture proceedings. The Court reached this conclusion after deciding that, when
viewed in their entirety, the forfeiture statutes are only intended to penalize an individual for criminal activity. Justice Harlan commented, "[F]rom the relevant constitutional
standpoint there is no difference between a man who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has
used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a 'criminal fine' of
$8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct." 401 U.S. at 718. As a result, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination would be applicable.
119. Claims brought under the fourth amendment for unreasonable search and
seizure have generally failed since there is no warrant or probable cause requirement
when the claimant is searched at the border. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606
(1977); see also United States v. One (1) 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda,
625 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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Litigants have asserted successful claims against the Government, arguing that property was seized or forfeited without adequate notice,x20 and
that excessive governmental delays in filing for forfeiture amounted to an
unconstitutional application of the forfeiture statutes.12 1 Potential remedies for these claims include the return of seized merchandise12 2 and recovery of fines and penalties,12 damages equal to the value of the property seized,124 and depreciation costs arising during the unlawful
detention. 2 5 In United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 2' the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a
lower court's decision ordering the Government to pay the owner of an
improperly forfeited vehicle the proceeds from the sale of the vehicle
along with depreciation costs from the time of its seizure to the time of
the sale. The court held that denial of this recovery would constitute "a
penalty, the exaction of which [is] constitutionally impermissible."' 2 7
Hence, it would not seem precocious to conclude that a similar "due
process" claim could be asserted where the Government loses and fails to
return goods pursuant to the finding of an unlawful seizure or forfeiture.' 28 Similarly, at least one author has suggested that if recovery is
permitted for depreciation, the same should be allowed when the property is returned damaged. 2 '

120. See United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 394, 397 (9th Cir.
1979) (recognizing the potential for a Tucker Act claim). Contra Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (holding notice need not be given in exigent
circumstances).
121. United States v. Vertol H21C Reg. No. N8540, 545 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir.
1976); Sarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1976) (nine month delay in
commencing forfeiture found to be an unconstitutional application of the relevant statutes), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974); see also Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms Div. of the Treasury Dep't of the United States, 530 F.2d 672, 677 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1976) (remedy may be available if the Customs Service should delay unnecessarily
in seeking forfeiture).
122. United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th
Cir. 1972).
123. See Vertol, 545 F.2d at 651.
124. Jaekel v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (value of automobile unlawfully forfeited deemed recoverable).
125. United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1973).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 886 (citing U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 715).
128. See, e.g., Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (alleging
$165,220.50 worth of camera supplies "pilfered").
129. See Note, supra note 23, at 95; see also United States v. One (1) Douglas A26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 1981); United States v. One (1) 1972
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While this method of recovery seems appealing, the "due process"
claim is severely restricted in its applicability. Procedurally, the due process claim only appears relevant if the Government files for forfeiture.1"'
Still, it is not clear whether the due process violation should be asserted
in a separate action under the Tucker Act only after a claimant prevails
at the forfeiture proceeding or whether a claim will be permitted as a
defense or counterclaim in the forfeiture proceeding itself."' If the
claimant successfully asserts the unconstitutionality of the seizure as an
affirmative defense to the forfeiture, the property is merely returned to
the claimant and there may be no recovery for depreciation. 3 2 If the
claimant proceeds under a separate action for damages under the Tucker
Act, the court would be without jurisdiction if the claim "sounded in
tort" because the Tucker Act gives the court jurisdiction only for claims
founded upon the Constitution or implied or express contracts with the
Government."' Additionally, the property owner must limit claims to
the district court. Several claims courts have refused to hear due process
claims on the ground that the fifth amendment does not obligate the
United States to pay money damages.'3 4 Since the claims court jurisdiction extends only to claims in which money damages are mandated, the
courts will be without jurisdiction to hear fifth amendment claims."'
The plaintiffs damages claim would have to be limited to the $10,000
jurisdictional limit of the district courts under the Tucker Act.1 6 Finally,
should the claim be successful, the claimant's recovery may yet be limited

Wood 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1974). Both
Douglas and Custom Boat, recognize that a Tucker Act claim for unconstitutional forfeiture and damages may have merit. In Douglas, customs officials had assured a plane
owner that appropriate measures were being taken to protect an aircraft in storage. 662
F.2d at 1374 n.4. In Custom Boat, the court said that the boat owners claim for damage
and loss of service could be addressed in a Tucker Act claim. 501 F.2d at 1330.
130. Note, supra note 23, at 95; see Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d at 1377
(allowing counterclaim). Compare United States v. Vertol H21C Reg. No. N8540, 545
F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1976) with Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974). The applicability of a due process claim for inadequate notice prior to
seizure will often depend on the "exigent" circumstances.
131. For a discussion on the split of authority, see United States v. Lockheed L-188
Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 393-97 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. See Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 396.
133. Id.
134. Cabrera v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 219, 221-22 (1986); Shaw v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 796, 800 (1985).
135. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 397-98; Shaw v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct.
796, 800 (1985).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
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if "it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure.
2.

u3 7

Bailment: Claims Founded Upon Implied-in-Fact Contracts

The decisions reached in Alliance,"31 Hatzlachh,13 9 and Kosak 4 0 inevitably left open the possibility of a recovery against the United States
founded upon a theory of an implied-in-fact contract of bailment. The
Tucker Act extends jurisdiction to both district courts and claims courts
to hear and render judgment upon any monetary claim against the Government "founded . . . upon any express or implied contracts." 4

A

claim under this theory would allege that the Customs Service breached
an express or implied "promise, representation or statement that the
goods will be guarded or carefully handled"' 4 when the goods were lost
or returned in a damaged condition.
There are two predominant policy reasons for the extensive waiver of
governmental immunity in contract under the Tucker Act.143 First, the
availability of a remedy for breach will encourage individuals to contract
with the Government.1 44 Second, the Government in this circumstance

137. 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1982). This section allows the court, upon a finding of probable cause, to issue a certificate precluding the claimant from recovering court costs and
other costs incident to the seizure. United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d
1481, 1491 (10th Cir. 1984) (reasonable seizure of alleged adulterated beef); JarboeLackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329, 336-337 (1985) (holding "costs" do
not apply to diminished value of the property); United States v. One 1949 GMC Truck,
104 F. Supp. 34, 37 (E.D. Va. 1950).
138. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
141. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1982).
142. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d 617, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
143. Originally, Congress enacted the Tucker Act as a response to the inefficient
means of handling private relief legislation, see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying
text, and only provided jurisdiction to bring a suit against the Government under a "takings" analysis. The Government could be attributed with the expansion of jurisdiction to
contract rights under the premise that a "takings" action could only be maintained if
there was a promise by the Government to make just compensation for the property
taken. Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593 (1893). Because the Constitution could not
theoretically create a new right of action, and the Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction
over actions in tort, the plaintiff was forced to sue under contract. See Note, supra note
83, at 876.
144. See Note, supra note 83, at 876. While the waiver may have initially led to an
increase in parties willing to contract with the Government, current confusion over the
inconsistent application of the doctrines of implied-in-law contracts and implied-in-fact
contracts may severely constrain this phenomenon. See Note, Dealing with a Not-SoBenevolent Uncle: Implied Contracts with Federal Government Agencies, 37 STAN. L.
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will not be exposed to the unforeseen and unlimited liabilities commonly
associated with a waiver of tort immunity.14 5 Courts initially applied
these implied contract actions in early "takings" cases, reasoning that the
Government intended to recompense owners for the "taking" rather than
to violate its constitutional duty to compensate under the fifth
46
amendment.1
While the Tucker Act extends jurisdiction to contracts implied-in-fact,
it does not do the same for those implied-in-law. 47 A contractual relationship created by implication of law imposes a duty of restitution on
the party sued in order to prevent that party's unjust enrichment. 4 The
rationale for excluding implied-in-law contracts stems from the fear that
this recovery infringes on the retention of tort immunity. 4 An impliedin-fact contract, on the other hand, is created when the parties' intent to
contract is "inferred as a matter of reason or justice from the acts or
conduct of the parties.""'5
Although these contracts are commonly regulated by federal contract
law, 15 ' the implied-in-fact contract must possess all the same key elements of an express contract: mutuality of intent to contract, an offer and
acceptance, consideration, and authority to contract.'5 2 With respect to a
custom's detention-bailment relationship, the intent and the offer and acceptance elements "must show an agreement based upon a meeting of

REv. 1367, 1381 (1985).
145. Note, supra note 83, at 876. See generally James, supra note 20. This appears
to be consistent with the maintenance of some governmental immunity.
146. Note, supra note 83, at 876-77.
147. United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926);
Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 743, 749 (1985).
148. Collins v. United States, 532 F.2d 1344, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Note, supra note
144, at 1374-75 ("The sole purpose of a contract implied in law is to create a remedy.").
The Tucker Act exclusion of jurisdiction to contracts in law is criticized for allowing a
government agency to profit at the expense of the private party, especially where no
remedy exists under the FTCA. Note, supra note 83, at 882; see Note, supra note 144,
at 1375.
149. Note, supra note 83, at 882.
150. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States, 801 F.2d 1295, 1297 (F. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); see Note, supra note 144, at 1372-73.
151. There are numerous exceptions to the maxim that government contracts are
treated the same as those under general contract law. For example, the Government
often uses the doctrines of apparent authority and sovereign immunity as affirmative
defenses to deny the contractual capacity of the federal agency that purports to act, or is
perceived as acting, on behalf of the United States. Note, supra note 144, at 1379-81;
Note, supra note 83, at 884-87.
152. Prudential,801 F.2d at 1297; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S.
592 (1923).
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the minds that can be inferred, as a fact, from the conduct of the parties
under existing circumstances which manifests their tacit understanding."1 53 Additionally, the claimant must prove the elements of a bailment. A bailment is said to arise when an owner, while retaining title,
delivers goods or personal property to another, either for deposit or particular use upon an express or implied contract that provides a return of
the goods to the owner or subsequent disposition of the property in ac1 54
cordance with the owner's directions.
The leading case supporting recovery for lost or damaged property
against the Government under an implied contract is Alliance Assurance
Co. v. United States.' 55 The court in Alliance found an implied-infact contract of bailment through an "implied promise" of the Customs
Service to return goods to the lawful owner after an inspection at the
customs house to determine if the goods were properly declared in the
invoice. This "implied promise" was essentially inferred from claim tickets issued by the Customs Service to the owner; the tickets were
"designed to restore the goods to the owner."' 56 When the tickets were
presented, the officials were unable to locate the goods. The court, analogizing to the situation in which the recompensation rationale under the
"taking" theory is applied, found an action for breach of an implied duty
to use due care during the time of the bailment. The court also found
that the confidence and trust placed in the bailee and the fact that the
bailment was for the exclusive benefit of the Government supplied suffi57
cient consideration for the implied agreement.'
While courts have found implied-in-fact contracts in numerous situations,' 5 8 decisions that support the Alliance rationale are virtually nonexistent. Although the Supreme Court in Hatzlachh alluded to the possibility of finding an implied-in-fact contract, on remand the Claims Court
failed to find that one existed.' 59 Perhaps this failure resulted from the

153. Prevado Village Partnership v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 219, 224 (1983); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 743, 748 (1985).
154. Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 840 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
155. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
156. Id. at 532.
157. Id. at 533 (citing Seigal v. Spear & Co., 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414, 416

(1923)).
158. See, e.g., Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1982) (negligent
maintenance of a highway easement); Algonae Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241
(Ct. Cl. 1970), supplemented, 458 F.2d 1373 (Ct. Cl. 1983) (storage of goods); Pacific
Maritime Ass'n v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 603 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (payment of gratui-

tous services).

159. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 743, 749-50 (1985).
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approach taken by the property owners in Hatzlachh, which differed to
a large extent from the approach taken in Alliance.
In Hatzlachh, customs officials seized and forfeited a shipment of
camera supplies under 19 U.S.C. section 1592.60 The Department of
Treasury granted a remission of the forfeiture upon payment of $40,000
in penalties. Hatzlachh made the payment and the customs officials released the supplies. Hatzlachh filed a complaint alleging that over
$165,000 worth of the supplies were "pilfered" while in the Government's custody.' In an attempt to establish an implied-in-fact contract
of bailment with the Government, Hatzlachh relied on the statutory context of customs forfeiture and detention procedure and the Treasury Department's decision to remit the forfeiture.'6 2 According to Hatzlachh, 19
U.S.C. section 1605 placed the goods in the custody of the Customs Service "to await disposition according to the law."' 6 3 Further, Hatzlachh
argued that 28 U.S.C. section 2465 placed the Customs Service under a
specific duty to return the goods if the petitioner prevailed on the forfeiture actions."' Hatzlachh concluded from these sections that the Treasury's decision to remit the goods after payment of a penalty was an
"explicit promise to redeliver them" that "gave rise to an implied and
(apparently) a retroactively effective, 'promise to use due care during the
term of the bailment'." 165 The court rejected this notion, holding that the
Customs Service's "forcible and unilateral acts of seizing the goods and
declaring them forfeited for violations of customs laws... [and] the 'existing circumstances' nonetheless clearly negated any notion of a 'tacit
understanding' to an implied in fact contract of bailment with respect to
66
those seized goods.'
The Claims Court made two other interesting and important findings.
First, despite not finding an implied-in-fact contract, the court did find
that the Customs Service failed to exercise due care.I6 7 In particular, the
Customs Service failed to request larger storage facilities from the warehouse owner, and failed to assign a security guard to protect the goods

160.
161.

162.
(1985),
163.
164.

Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.

Brief for Plaintiff, Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 743
(No. 78-1175) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982).
Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 162; see also Hatzlachh, 579 F.2d at 619 (Ct. Cl.

1978).
165. Hatzlachh, 7 Cl. Ct. at 748.
166. Id. at 749-50.
167. Id. at 753-54 (had the court found a bailment relationship, the Customs Service
would have been liable).
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when the Customs Service was fully aware supplies were continually
pilfered.1 6 Upon a showing that the property owner did not originally
violate any customs laws and that the Government benefited from the
seizure, a possible cognizable claim under a plaintiff-oriented "takings"
theory arises."6 " Moreover, if the Customs Service unconstitutionally forfeited the property, then a remedy may be available under the due process clause.1' Furthermore, equity could argue for the breach of an
implied-in-law contract to prevent the Government from further wrongdoing." Success under these theories unfortunately would hinge on establishing that the Government "benefit[ed]" from its actions. In the case
of "pilfered" goods, this would require a showing of who the "pilferers"
were, thus lifting the liability from the Government. 1 2 Likewise, exaggerated damages does not help a claimant's credibility. It is conceivable
that the court was affected by its finding that Hatzlachh suffered only
slightly over $4,000 in damages, not the $165,000 alleged in his
complaint.' 73
The few cases that find an implied-in-fact obligation on the Government do so on the basis of written or express evidence that tends to show
In Bielass v. New England Safe Systems
an intent to be bound.'
household
goods, sold at a public auction without noInc.,"" owners of
tice by the Customs Service, brought an action against a private storage
company (Safe Systems) and the United States for damages resulting
from the sale. The owner alleged that Safe Systems had arranged on his
behalf to have the Customs Service store his goods while he was in the
process of moving back to the United States from West Germany. Apparently due to the lack of proper documentation, the Customs Service
thought the goods were "unclaimed or abandoned." After the goods had
remained in storage for over a year, the Customs Service sold the goods
at public auction. The district court denied summary judgment for the
Government, holding that a reasonable jury could infer that either the

168. Id. at 753.
169. See supra notes 83-117 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
172. See infra Part II, C.
173. Hatzlachh, 7 Cl. Ct. at 754-55 & n.34. The court found testimony of the plaintiffs president unpersuasive and without any probative value.
174. See, e.g., Algonac, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (contract dispute between a
government contractor and the army led to a claim for storage costs for materials needed
for the contracts); Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1982) (court found a
duty to maintain the property from the language of the deed).
175. 617 F. Supp. 682 (D. Mass. 1985).
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owner or Safe Systems, acting on behalf of the owner, reached at least a
tacit understanding with the Customs Service that the Customs Service
would place the owner's belongings in a warehouse and not sell them
without prior notice. In reaching its decision, the court relied on evidence
of several contacts between Safe Systems and the Customs Service. 17
The contacts were described as regarding "storage charges on behalf of
the plaintiff. 1 "7The court also acknowledged that the Customs Service's
failure to follow its own notice regulation may have led to the unfortu178
nate incident.
Notwithstanding this conclusion in Safe Systems, the weight of authority opposes the finding of an implied-in-fact contract of bailment in
property detention situations.17 9 A majority of courts reject the bailment
theory because the claimant fails to establish both the requisite elements
of bailment and contract. In a bailment relationship, the property owner
must maintain title in the transferred property. 8 " When the Customs
Service forcibly seizes or forfeits the property, it usurps a "right to title,
subject only to judicial determination." ' The bailment relationship does
not arise due to this transfer of title. Consequently, the court can not
reasonably impose an obligation on the Government to care for property

176. Id. at 685.
177. Id. at 685 (quoting from plaintiff's answers).
178. Id. at 686.
179. Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 11 CI. Ct. 1 (1986); Cabrera
v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 219 (1986); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct.
743 (1985).
180. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
181. Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 258 (S.D. Ga. 1977). On remand,
the Claims Court in Hatzlachh expanded this notion. The Government argued that a
section 1592 seizure was an act that amounted to an effective transfer of title to the
United States. The court did not accept this conclusion, but it did say the act was enough
to give the United States "unperfected" title to the property and therefore grounds arose
to deny the bailment relationship. On the other hand, it is questionable whether title is
ever transferred when goods are damaged during inspection at the border. Walker, 438
F. Supp. at 258 ("An inspection and a seizure are two different things, creating two
different relationships."). In Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, for example, the
goods were being checked against the invoice and were not seized for customs violations.
252 F.2d, 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1958). However, consistent with the Claims Court holding
in Hatzlachh, the goods were inspected pursuant to statutory requirements. Id. ("Imported merchandise ... shall not be delivered from customs custody ... until it has been
inspected, examined, or appraised and is reported by the appropriate customs officer to
have been truly and correctly invoiced and found to comply with the requirements of the
laws of the United States... " 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (1982)). An inspection at the border is
also pursuant to statutory authority. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982).
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in its custody."" 2 This same rationale also destroys any notion of meeting
of the minds or tacit understanding between the parties. Likewise, since
seizure and detention of the'owner's property is done under the authority
of law, any attempt to establish a free and voluntary bargain or implied
promise of "due care" seems baseless. 8 Seizure and detention under
statutory authority also preclude a finding of consideration to validate
the contract.""
The facts of Alliance also elucidate the lack of the other implied contract elements. Since Alliance was an inspection case, one may infer that
the offer and acceptance accompanied the transfer of the claim tickets.
Unfortunately, no receipt system exists that is analogous to the tickets in
Alliance when the Customs Service seizes goods for alleged violations of
customs laws. 85
Finally, federal contract law will only bind the Government in contract if the federal agency has actual authority to make the promise, representation, or statement. 8 The Government cannot be bound to an implied contract by apparent authority.1 87 Courts have been unable to find
facts that evince a promise carefully to handle an owner's property made
by a government official with proper authorization. 8 8
Outside the specific facts surrounding Alliance, or possibly the express
evidence of intent in Bielass, the theory of an implied-in-fact contract of
bailment fails to provide the victims of detention-related property dam-

182.

A similar conclusion was reached in Note, supra note 23, at 95; see also Com-

ment, Imported Goods and Negligence by Customs Officials: The Liability of the
Crown-Zien v. The Queen, 1986 LLOYD'S MAR. COM. L.Q. 430, 423 (Canadian authorities also hold that when the Crown holds goods pending payment of a duty no
bailment relationship arises).

183. Hatzlachh, 7 Cl. Ct. at 749.
184. Cf Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 1, 4-5 (1986)
(statements that funds were available for inspection is not a promise to pay); see also
Cabrera v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 219, 221 (1986) (plaintiff filling out forms according to statute not consideration).
185. Cf Cabrera, 10 Cl. Ct. 221 (administrative forms do not evidence meeting of
minds). But see LaChance v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 127, 128, 130 (1988) (DEA
officials gave plaintiff a "receipt" for seizing $49,000 in cash, although plaintiff failed
properly to allege a contract claim).
186. Hatzlachh, 7 Cl. Ct. at 745; Shaw, 8 Cl. Ct. at 799; see Note, supra note 83, at
885; Note, supra note 144, at 1378 (arguing for the applicability of apparent authority
to government controls).
187. See Note, supra note 83, at 884; Note, supra note 144, at 1389.
188. Traditional theory claims that any attempt to bind the Government by apparent
authority will destroy any evidence of mutual assent to contract. Note, supra note 83, at
885. Contra Note, supra note 144, at 1389-90 (calling for the abolition of this affirmative defense if the agent has induced the party to contract).

414

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol 22:385

age with an adequate remedy. The apparent flaws in the theory have led
many to suggest that if any recovery is permitted in these situations, it is
not under an implied-in-fact contract, but rather under one implied-inlaw.189 This conclusion is doctrinally consistent with the denial recovery
rationale under the FTCA. Requiring the owner to prove the elements
of contract and bailment not only will "screen out" fraudulent claims but
also prevent the impediment of the Government's enforcement systems.' 9 ' In fact, several courts suggest that an underlying rationale for
denying recovery under this theory is the "congressional policy of exempting Customs from liability against tort claims arising out of detention of goods."' 91 It is logically and legislatively inconsistent to allow
recovery in contract under the same set of facts for which recovery is
denied in tort.11 2 According to one court, finding an implied-in-fact contract in these circumstances would "judicially allow by the back door a
claim which was, rather clearly and explicitly, legislatively barred at the
'193
front.
C.

PersonalLiability of Customs Officials

Neither the absence nor the availability of a suit against the Government affects the long-standing practice of holding customs officials liable
in their individual capacities for improper performance of their duties. 9
This remains true even without the statutory indemnification provided in
either 28 U.S.C. section 2006, or section 2465.195 Courts have permitted

189. See supra note 147; see also Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S.
460, 467 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Shaw, 8 Cl. Ct. at 799; Cabrera,10 Cl. Ct.
at 221 (suggesting that if the plaintiff's property were unnecessarily subjected to forfeiture the remedy would be one at law).
190. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 461 & n.24 (1984).
191. See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 259 (S.D. Ga. 1977).
192. Several courts have recognized this inconsistency. For example, the Fifth Circuit in A & D Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1982), noticed the
factual similarity under the heading, "A Case of Negligent Tort or Contract Bailment-A Distinction Without a Difference?" Id. at 673.
193. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d 617, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1978);
Walker, 438 F. Supp. at 259 (if this is the law, "it is an even bigger ass than Mr.
Bumble supposed").
194. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). In Hatzlachh Supply
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a contractual remedy
was not inconsistent with an action against customs officials individually. 444 U.S. 460,
465-66 (1980). Likewise, the Supreme Court in Kosak held denial of recovery under
section 2680(c) was consistent with adequate alternative remedies such as suits against
individual customs officials. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 860-61 (1984).
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1982) is generally intended to prevent prosecutions against
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claims against individual officers in cases involving wrongful seizure or
detention (conversion) of goods,19 negligent handling of property,' and
failure to institute judicial forfeiture proceedings promptly."9 8
Remedies for these actions have been based on the requisite showing
of either a common law tort or constitutional violation. Common law
actions are typically brought under a theory of negligence or conversion
resulting from a breach of bailment. Thus, a court held a customs collector personally liable for conversion where one of his subordinates delivered a shipment of pimentoes to one not entitled to possession.99 Similarly, a court awarded costs and nominal damages where the detention of
goods by the collector of customs was unduly delayed.20 0
Until recently, common law suits were successful despite the scope of
official immunity.2 'O The doctrine of absolute official immunity has been

government officers in cases where property is seized pursuant to an act of Congress but
forfeiture fails. If the judge certifies that reasonable cause exists for the seizure, then the
claimant's recovery is limited to costs payable by the Government and the officer is exempt from any personal liability. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2006 (1982) provides that the United States Treasury pays any judgments
against an officer while in performance of his duties upon the issuance of a certificate of
probable cause or when the court certifies that the officer was following orders. Id. Section 2006 has been treated as a possible remedy for loss or injury to property while in
the custody of the customs collector. See Agnew v. Haymes, 141 F. 631 (4th Cir. 1905).
According to the court in Agnew, if the property was lost or damaged through the negligence of the officer, the officer is personally liable. Id. at 639. On the other hand, if the
damage results through no fault of the officer, the owner of the property can still collect
for the damage against the officer personally, but the Government could issue a certificate
providing for the recovery to be paid from the United States Treasury. Id. These indemnity statutes historically grew out of complications with the collection of taxes and duties.
In order to curb the unfavorable practice of customs collectors retaining large sums of
money for indemnity, Congress passed legislation obligating the Government to pay judgments recovered against collectors while in the course of their duties. See Note, supra
note 83, at 838-40.
196. Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1945) (illegal detention of
books for the duration of World War II).
197. Nakasheff v. Continental Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (defendant
filed a third party action against a customs collector for the loss of goods).
198. State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (action
brought by ship charterer for return of seized goods and damages due to his inability to
deliver goods to importers); see also Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 462 U.S. 1101 (1983).
199. Conklin v. Newton, 34 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1929).
200. Truth Seeker Co., 147 F.2d at 54. Further, the court held that the return of
goods did not serve as a complete defense but only to mitigate damages. Id. at 56.
201. See Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988) (issue of material fact as to
whether official immunity barred state tort law claim).
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judicially weakened, and applies only where the challenged conduct is
"within the outer perimeter" of the officials duties and discretionary in
nature. 2 In response to the erosion of this doctrine, Congress enacted
the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988 (Liability Reform Act).2 03 The Liability Reform Act provides that
upon certification by the Attorney General that the employee was acting
"within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident
out of which the claim arose," the action shall be deemed against the
United States and not the individual official. 20 4 This makes the United
States vicariously liable for common law negligence of its employees,
however, the officer remains personally liable for egregious misconduct.20 5 Under the Liability Reform Act, the United States would enjoy
the statutory exceptions to the FTCA including section 2680(c). 2"'
The Liability Reform Act is untested, yet it seems to pose severe limitations for common law actions brought against Customs Officials. Additionally, a major problem with common law tort actions is that customs
officers are generally not liable for acts of their subordinates.20 " Thus,
the plaintiff will not recover unless he can prove egregious misconduct
against the specific individual who lost or damaged his goods.20 ' Even if
the claimant can show a violation of a federal statute or regulation, the
action fails unless it is shown that the officer breached a common law
209
duty owed to the claimant.

202. Id. at 582, 585.
203. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) [hereinafter Liability Reform Act].
204. Id. § 6 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)).
205. 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (No. 10B) 5949.
206. Liability Reform Act, supra note 203, § 6 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d)(4)); 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (No. 108) 5949-50.
207. James, supra note 20, at 636. Also note that a customs official may be liable for
negligence in supervision or selection of employees. Id. at 636 n.163.
208. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 860-61 (1984); see also Note, supra note
23, at 96.
209. Geo. Byers Sons, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 135
(D. Md. 1979). The court granted summary judgment for customs officials where an
importer alleged that the officials negligently admitted into commerce motorcycles that
did not bear proper certificates of compliance with federal safety standards. To hold
officials responsible for negligent performance of their statutory duty, the importers had
to show that they were in the class designed to be protected by the legislation and that
the harm they suffered was the type the statute protected against. The court held that the
importers failed to meet this test and, absent any state common law duty owed the importers, the officials were not liable. Id. at 138-39; see also Castleberry v. Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms Div. of the Treasury Dep't of United States, 530 F.2d 672, 674 (5th
Cir. 1976) (proper action could be brought against officials as individuals in state court
under "replevin, detinue, or perhaps trover"); Nakasheff v. Continental Ins. Co., 89 F.
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Since the Liability Reform Act is inapplicable to civil actions brought
for a violation of the constitution,21 0 a plaintiff may bring an alternative
action against a federal official for violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz," 2 extended the Bivens rationale to actions based on first amendment due process property
interests. In States Marine Lines, the plaintiff alleged a violation of the
fifth amendment against customs agents who, without a warrant, seized
cargo from the plaintiff's vessel valued at $39,619.45. The District Director of Customs refused to return the cargo until the penalties for statutory violations were paid. According to the court, since the Supreme
Court permitted an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against state
officials based on a claim of deprivation of property without due process
of law, the same right to sue is permissible under the fifth amendment
against federal officials.2"
Although some argue that the Bivens action is superior to an action
under the Tucker Act and the fifth amendment "just compensation" and

Supp. 87, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (quoting Judge Learned Hand). But cf. Bielass v. New
England Safe System, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 682 (D. Mass. 1985) (evidence of the Customs
Service's failure to comply with its own regulations considered).
210. Liability Reform Act, supra note 203, § 6 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(2)); 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (No. 108) 5949-50.
211. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971); see Comment, Unreasonable Search and Seizure Gives a Right of
Action for Damages Against Federal Narcotics Agents: Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 205 (1972).
212. 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974).
213. Id. at 1157. In sum, the court stated:
To permit a party to sue for the alleged deprivation of his property without due
process of law by persons acting under color of state law and not permit a suit for
damages against a federal officer for identical acts in violation of the identical
provisions in the Fifth Amendment can only be justified, if at all, by the fact that
Congress specifically recognized the potential liability of state officers for their allegedly unconstitutional acts in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But, in light of the court's decision in Bivens, the fact that Congress has not specifically recognized a cause of
action for damages against federal officers is no longer an obstacle preventing federal courts from fashioning a damage remedy, where appropriate, directly from
the Constitution.
On relevant collateral issues the court held that neither the FTCA nor the section
2006 or section 2465 indemnity provisions precluded a suit against the officers individually. Id. at 1149-51. The court further held that the case fell within the exception to the
sovereign immunity doctrine because the manner in which the defendants exercised their
duties may have violated the fifth amendment. Id. at 1151.
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"due process" clauses,21 4 the Bivens action is similarly restricted. The
Bivens action provides for a jury trial and carries a greater deterrent
effect against governmental officers, yet its scope appears limited to delays in instituting forfeiture proceedings and thus restricted to damage
remedies associated with detention (i.e., loss of use, depreciation). 2 5 Additionally, "special factors" may counsel: hesitation in applying a Bivens
action. The individual officer charged with the violation must not occupy
a "status" such that a judgment against him will "significantly impair
his ability to perform public functions."2 1 Additionally, the claimant
must demonstrate the lack of an effective alternative remedy.21 7
A claimant bringing a Bivens action also will likely encounter the doctrine of official immunity. When federal executive officials exercising discretion violate constitutional rights they are entitled only to qualified immunity, as compared with the absolute immunity defense to common law
tort claims.21 ' The qualified immunity rule will protect customs agents,

214. Weiss v. Lehman, 642 F.2d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated 454 U.S. 807
(1982); Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d at 804, 811 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 463 U.S. 1101
(1983).
215. See, e.g., Seguin, 645 F.2d at 804; Shultz, 498 F.2d at 1146 (damages for charter's inability to deliver goods). The precedential value of Seguin was lessened somewhat
after the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred
and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 55 (1983). The Court in
Currency held that an eighteen month delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings was
justified on the basis of a balancing test. 461 U.S. at 569. The Seguin court found a
district director liable for a four and one-half month delay. Though vacated, Seguin
offers authority that a district director can be liable despite official immunity, where the
official "actually know[s] or should know that an action violates someone's constitutional
rights." Seguin, 645 F.2d at 809.
Moreover, until recently, using the Shultz analogy with section 1983 actions may have
provided a claim under the fifth amendment where due process was violated by a negligent act of an official. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981) (loss of prisoner's hobby kit, "even though negligently caused, amount to a due process violation").
However, the Supreme Court in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), specifically
overruled Parrattto the extent that a due process violation could be alleged based upon a
negligent act.
216. Weiss, 642 F.2d at 267; see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). This
criteria is consistent with the general rule of sovereign immunity as laid out by the Supreme Court in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). If the judgment affects the
Treasury, interferes with public administration, or restrains government action, the suit
is probably against the sovereign. Shultz, 498 F.2d at 1150; see also Castleberry v. Alcohol Tobacoo & Firearms Div. of the Treasury Dep't of the United States, 530 F.2d 672,
674 (5th Cir. 1976).
217. Carlson v. Greene, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). .This standard is easily met,
given the purpose of this Note.
218. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507. The Liability Reform Act was enacted to directly over-
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as employees of the Treasury Department, from damage actions where
"(1) at the time and in the light of all of the circumstances there existed
reasonable grounds for their belief that the action they took was appropriate, and (2) the agents acted in good faith."2'19 The rule implies that
the defense may not be available where the officer acts unreasonably or
negligently in the performance of his duties.220 Finally, a Bivens action
may also encounter similar proof problems facing common law tort
claims. 22 '
Aside from the immunity and proof problems, the policy question as
to whether courts should hold officials personally liable for improper
performance of their duties is often debated. Some courts argue that the
deterrence of negligent or unconstitutional acts is enhanced when recovery is against the individual officers.22 2 This is particularly true in cases
of gross negligence or willful misconduct. 2 Proponents of personal liability argue that personal liability of Customs Service agents satisfies the
elements of retribution and personal fault. They argue that even if courts
require indemnification by the United States, an administrative disciplinary system including fines, suspensions, or reimbursement satisfies society's demand that individuals answer personally for egregious conduct.2 24
Conversely, opponents argue that the deterrent effect may inhibit the
willingness of officials to implement vigorous enforcement policies.2 25
Furthermore, official immunity works to deny a remedy completely, and
the absence of vicarious liability only permits recovery against financially
weak individuals.22 6 As a result, this remedy leaves the compensatory
goal of tort litigation unsolved.
Given these drawbacks, holding customs officials personally liable for
their actions still may be the only judicial remedy available to property
damage victims. The remedy is consistent with the holding in Kosak.

rule Westfall v. Erwin. Liability Reform Act, supra note 203, at § 2(a)(7).
219. Shelton v. United States Customs Service, 565 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977).
220. See Seguin, 645 F.2d at 810; Shultz, 498 F.2d at 1158-59.
221. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
222. Seguin, 645 F.2d at 811; Weiss, 642 F.2d at 267.
223. See Bermann, supra note 20, at 1197.
224. See id. at 1197-99. Though Bermann argues for a strong administrative enforcement scheme when the Government has exclusive liability for the torts of its officers,
the same conclusion possibly is reached when the Government is forced to pay out extraordinary sums of money under one of the indemnity statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. §§
2006, 2465 (1982).
225. See Liability Reform Act, supra note 203, at § 2(a)(5)-(6).
226. Id. at § 2(a)(b); 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (No. 10B) 5946-47;
see James, supra note 20, at 639.
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There the Court reasoned that the existence of this remedy, coupled with
the indemnity statutes, supported their interpretation of section
2680(c).227 However, the Liability Reform Act's limitation on common
law tort claims leaves the plaintiff with only a Bivens action for recovery. As such, the Court should be more willing to recognize official misconduct involving the supervision of employees.228 If the property owner
can show that the damage resulted from an official's wrongful supervision or authorization, liability should attach to that official.22 Thus,
when a Customs Service officer fails, for example, to request larger storage facilities or extra security to guard goods, a plaintiff should prevail
without having to show which official set the cargo out in the rain or
pilfered the containers.23 Liability should likewise extend to an official
who wrongfully authorizes an extensive search, during which a car is
dismantled and rendered inoperable.231 Consequently, as the Government argued in Kosak, parties should be allowed to bring suits against
232
the relevant district directors.
III.

LEGISLATIVE RELIEF

Despite the possibility that no remedy exists against the Government
under the FTCA or Tucker Act, the claimant may, as a last resort, 233
petition a member of Congress to introduce a private bill of relief.23' A
private bill is a means reserved by Congress to provide or facilitate a

227. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
228. See Kosak, 465 U.S. at 848, 860-66 & n.23.
229. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
230. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 743, 751-55 (1985); see supra
notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
231. See Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985).
The court alluded to the potential of liability on the part of the officers, citing Bivens. Id.
at 824.
232. Kosak, 465 U.S. 848, 861 n.23.
233. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 21.01, at 1-160 to 161. The House of Representatives, for example, has rules prohibiting consideration of bills until all administrative and judicial remedies are exhausted. Id.; see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE

349 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY].
234. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 21.01, at 1-161. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
supra note 233, at 355; Glosser, Congressional Reference Cases in the United States
Court of Claims: A Historical and Current Perspective, 25 AM. L. REV. 595, 598
(1976). The claimant should note that enlisting the support of a local congressman will
probably cost a fee. See generally Gelhorn & Lauer, CongressionalSettlement of Tort
Claims Against the United States, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1958) (overview of procedure);
Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966).
TO CONGRESS
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remedy for one or several specified individuals.23 5 While the FTCA has
replaced much of the need for the private bill system, Congress still entertains bills for payment of private claims against the Government.2" 6
Congress derives its authority to act on private claims from article I,
section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution which provides that "Congress
shall have Power ...to pay the Debts ...of the United States."

The

Supreme Court interprets this clause as giving Congress the power to
satisfy "debts" owed by the nation to those individuals whose claims
arise out of "equitable" principles and are not recoverable in a court of
law. 3 Relief for these claims is often considered part of the Government's broad moral responsibility to create "equitable law" where the
inflexible application of the governing law leaves an individual without
remedy.2 39 Although these claims often show a close connection between
the Government and the injury, it is difficult to determine the actual
degree of closeness Congress requires.240
Claims for private relief against the Government have also taken the
form of tort and contract claims falling outside the scope of the
FTCA.2 4 ' These frequently concern wrongful or negligent acts committed by government agents.242 Congress may satisfy these "debts" through
various forms of relief, including the direct payment of funds to the
claimant.243 For example, a claimant was awarded a sum of money

235.

See, e.g., 1 L.

JAYSON,

supra note 30, § 21.01 at 1-158.3;

QUARTERLY, supra note 233, at 349, 351.
236. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra

CONGRESSIONAL

note 233, at 349; see Note, supra note
234, at 1696-97.
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
238. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896).
239. Glosser, supra note 234, at 596; see also Note, supra note 234, at 1697 ("Recovery may also be allowed when a claim is factually very close to those allowed under
an existing statutory scheme."); cf. Shane v. United States, 3 C1. Ct. 294, 304 (1983)
(referring to congressional reference legislation).
240. Note, supra note 234, at 1697-98; Glosser, supra note 234, at 617-25.
241. Note, supra note 234, at 1696-97; Note, supra note 23, at 88; CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, supra note 233, at 352.
242. Note, supra note 234, at 1696-97; see infra note 245.
243. The form of private relief is wholly within the discretion of Congress. It may
waive the statute of limitations; confer jurisdiction on a federal court; authorize a government official to hear and settle claims; and remove or increase an agency's settlement
authority. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 21.01, at 1-158.3 to 160. For example, Congress permitted suit against the Government, pursuant to Priv. L. No. 87-200, 75 Stat.
830 (1961), for a 7-year-old boy who severely burned himself when he came in contact
with high-voltage wires at a government transformer station. Taylor v. United States,
242 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Va. 1965); see also Mizokami v. United States, 414 F.2d 1375
(Ct. Cl. 1969) (private law conferring jurisdiction on Court of Claims for damages due
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when her auto was seriously damaged in a collision with an army
truck. " "' No relief was available under the FTCA because the driver
was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. 4 5
Once the claimant enlists the support of a representative or senator
and the private bill has been introduced, Congress has two options. First,
Congress may enact the bill in a similar fashion to public laws; after
committee consideration, it must pass both the House and Senate and be
signed by the President.2 4 Second, Congress may, through congressional
reference legislation, pass a resolution in either chamber that refers the
bill to the chief judge of the Claims Court for a determination of the
facts and appropriate remedy.247
Congressional reference legislation requires the assigned hearing officer to determine factual conclusions, whether the claim is legal, equitable, or a gratuity, and the amount, if any, owed by the Government. 24 8
With a few exceptions, the procedures before the hearing officer generally follow the rules applicable in a federal court.24 9 A panel reviews the
hearing officer's findings and the chief judge transmits the panel's decision back to the congressional chamber that originally referred the claim
to the court.2 5 0 Congress rarely disagrees with the recommendations of
the hearing officer.20 1

to FDA error).
Congress may also refer the claim to the United States Claims Court through the use
of congressional reference legislation. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text; 28

U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1982).
244. Priv. L. No. 87-552, 76 Stat. 1359 (1962).
245. Id.
246.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 233, at 349, 355-58; Glosser, supra

note 234, at 628.
247. Congress enacted the congressional reference statutes (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1492, 2509 (1982)) to avoid spending too much time on private bills. Glosser, supra note
234, at 598-99 & n.18. While Glosser's article makes reference to "commissioners," the
congressional reference statute was amended in 1982 to change "commissioner's" to
"hearing officer." Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 139(h)(1)-(2), 96 Stat. 42-43 (1982); CONGRESsupra note 233, at 358-59 (referring to "commissioners").
248. 28 U.S.C. § 2509(c) (1982) ("The hearing officer to whom a congressional reference case is assigned . . . shall append to his findings of fact conclusions sufficient to
inform Congress whether the demand is a legal or equitable claim or a gratuity, and the
amount, if any, legally or equitably due from the United States to the claimant."); see
Glosser, supra note 234, at 608.
249. Glosser, supra note 234, at 605-08.
250. 28 U.S.C. § "2509(d)-(e) (1982); Glosser, supra note 234, at 610-12.
251. Glosser, supra note 234, at 627; see, e.g., Shane v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 294,
302 (1983).
SIONAL QUARTERLY,
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The reference to the "equitable claim" in section 2509 traditionally is
interpreted to signify the moral principles of right and justice used to
justify ordinary private bills.252 Some hearing officers, however, abandon
this approach and instead adopt a substantive law interpretation, utilizing the concept of fault and analogizing the claim to legal claims against
private parties.53 In Shane v. United States,2 r ' for example, a congressional reference case arose out of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's denial of Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance to the claimant based on a United States Air Force classification
of the claimant's property as located in a restrictive noise zone. In determining whether the claimant had an equitable claim against the Government for negligent classification, the hearing officer held that the claimant must show that "1) the government committed a negligent or
'255
wrongful act, and 2) this act caused damage to the claimant.
Despite congressional efforts to streamline procedures for investigating
claims,2 56 the private bill route is problematic insofar as the success of

the claim depends on many factors.2

With this in mind, one commenta-

tor provides suggestions to smooth the path.

58

Procedurally, the claim-

ant is reminded to exhaust all administrative and judicial remedies, including FTCA avenues; 25 9 to prepare a detailed statement of facts,
damages, and jurisdiction; and to develop correspondence or personal
contact with the agency involved, prior to scheduling a conference with

252. Shane, 3 Cl. Ct. at 304; see also Rumley v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 100, 111
(1965); Town of Kure Beach v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 597, 613 (1964) (equitable
claim based on moral and equitable considerations).
253. Glosser, supra note 234, at 620-22.
254. 3 Cl. Ct. 294 (1983).
255. Id. at 304 (claimant failed to make out an equitable claim under these proof
criteria).
256.

CONGRESSIONAL

QUARTERLY,

supra note 233, at 358.

257. These factors include whether the claim is meritorious; whether there is strong
sympathy for the claimant; the sufficiency of evidence; whether there is agency opposition; and whether the legislative sponsor pursues the claim vigorously. I L. JAYSON,
supra note 30, § 21.02, at 1-161.
While one may assume that these factors are equally applicable to ordinary private
claims and to congressional reference cases, the two approaches differ with respect to
political influence. Some argue that private claims are subject to "political pressures and
dealings." Note, supra note 23, at 86 n.21. Others claim the enactment of a bill through
congressional reference legislation is not dependent on political influence. Glosser, supra
note 234, at 598.
258. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 30, § 21.02, at 1-161 to 164.
259. One should note that congressional relief is still obtainable even after FTCA
claims are utilized and exhausted. Id. at 1-161 to 162.
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the member of Congress. 260 Once the claimant convinces the member to
sponsor the bill, counsel should prepare an alternative draft of the legislation for consideration. 261 After the bill is referred to the appropriate
subcommittee, the claimant's counsel should offer assistance to the member in preparing the necessary evidence to support the claim.26 2 Furthermore, counsel should assist the member in analyzing the government
agency report as soon as the subcommittee staff completes its investigation of the claim. The bill is then presented to the subcommittee as a
whole, and after a favorable report, proceeds to the House and Senate
for approval and eventually to the White House where the President
will either approve or veto the bill.26 3
Legislative relief, while considered out of date and ineffective, 2 may
offer the victim of property damage an avenue of relief. Cases such as
Formula One Motors26 5 and Insurance Company,2 66 where the property
owner is blameless and the customs inspection completely destroys the
property, may attract sympathy from congressional leaders. These cases
evince at least negligence and claimants could easily prove causation,
thus establishing an "equitable claim" under congressional reference legislation. 67 Even the property owner in Hatzlachh would be a likely candidate for legislative relief if it had not violated the law and had properly
established damages.26 8
Legislative relief does have procedural drawbacks, however. First, the
success of the bills depends too much on external factors.26 9 Second, in
order to succeed, the claimant needs to show that all judicial and administrative remedies are exhausted. 7 ° This may prove difficult, considering
the Supreme Court's holding in Kosak. While the Court then acknowledged that the lack of an effective remedy would not bar its decision, it

260. Id.
261. Id. at 1-162.
262. Id. at 1-162 to 163.
263. Id. at 1-163 to 164.
264. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
265. 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985). In Formula One Motors, the property owner
alleged that DEA agents "dismantled the car and damaged its parts to an extent far
beyond what was reasonably required to determine whether the vehicle contained narcotics," Id. at 824.
266. 11 Cl. Ct. 1 (1986). Customs Service officials twice dismantled over $88,000
worth of imported furniture in Insurance Company which ultimately rendered the furniture unusable. Id. at 2-3.
267. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 56.
269. See supra note 257.
270. See supra note 259.
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did recognize the availability of a remedy against customs officials in
their individual capacities.2"' Thus, claimants having the specific evidence to satisfy an "equitable claim" would probably also have the evidence to bring suit against the customs officials individually. This would
effectively narrow the possibility of legislative relief to cases where the
officials are protected by immunity. Finally, the claimant may also have
to show that he has made an attempt to settle his claim administratively.
IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

A claimant who feels damaged due to the unnecessary detention of
property may contest the seizure and detention in the forfeiture process.2" 2 The filing of a petition for remission or mitigation of any fines or
penalties is also permitted under 19 U.S.C. section 1618.273 While these
procedures may enable a property owner to prevent further depreciation
or damages due to a loss of use,27 4 they do little to comfort the owner of
property that has been physically damaged. Furthermore, an importer
who receives goods in a damaged condition may still be responsible for
duties on the goods.
Section 563 of the Tariff Act of 1930175 allows the Secretary of the

Treasury to "abate or refund" duties upon a proper showing that the
imported goods were damaged or lost while in the custody of the Customs Service. 27

The procedural requirements that the property owner

must follow are outlined in 19 C.F.R. sections 158.21-30.77 Under 19
C.F.R. § 158.26, for example, the importer must provide declarations
from practically all those who came in contact with a partially lost or
stolen package.2"' Proving that the merchandise was damaged or lost
while in Customs Service's custody remains a critical element to
recovery.
In Delia Failde v. United States,27 9 several carved stone figures imported from Mexico were discovered broken when received by the im271. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The court in Formula One Motors
recognized the potential for a Bivens action. 777 F.2d at 824.
272. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-18 (1982); see also supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
273.

This section is enabled in 19 C.F.R. §§ 171.11-.15 (1988).

274. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
275.

19 U.S.C. § 1563 (1982).

276. Id. § 1563(a).
277. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to proscribe regulations pertinent
to this section. Id.
278.

19 C.F.R. § 158.26 (1988).

279.

51 Cust. Ct. 170 (1963).
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porter. The customs collector reported, seven months after the date of
receipt, that there had been a 100 percent loss on the items. However,
due to the delay in filing, the importer's claim was denied. On review,
the court held that evidence of the inspection of the merchandise after it
had left the custody of Customs Service could not establish grounds for
abatement or a refund.2 80 The court also held that even if the goods were
shown at trial to have been damaged while in the Customs Service's custody, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny the application was final and nonreviewable.2 81 Here again, the owner of damaged
property is faced with proof problems, uncertainty of recovery, and a
negligible remedy at best.
On the other hand, property owners who have suffered minimal damages, and have an evidentially-sound claim against the Customs Service,
may find modest relief under the Small Claims Act which provides recovery for those with property damage claims against government employees.282 As part of an attempt to alleviate the pressures of private
legislation, Congress enacted the Small Claims Act.283 Though enacted
prior to the FTCA, the Small Claims Act is in no way superceded by it.
The FTCA deliberately saved the Small Claims Act to provide recovery
for those claims for which the FTCA denied recovery. 8 4 The Small
Claims Act was designed to compensate property damage victims for
claims "caused by the negligence of an officer or employee of the United
States Government acting within the scope of employment."2 8 Indeed,
the Act has been specifically described as a remedy for "claims for damage to goods in customs custody due to the negligence of customs
employees."' 88
Under the Act, each agency head is given the authority to settle property damage and loss claims up to $1,000.287 The claim must be filed

within one year, 288 and must not be eligible for settlement under the

280. Id. at 171.
281. Id.; see also Camilo E. Rosello, Inc. v. United States, 63 Cust. Ct. 454, 456
(1969) (Secretary of Treasury decision is final).
282. 31 U.S.C. § 3723 (1982).
283. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level: The FTCA Administrative
Process, 35 CASE W. REs. L.R. 509, 521 (1984-85).
284. Id. at 522; see Nakasheff v. Continental Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 87, 90 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950).
285. 31 U.S.C. § 3723(a)(1) (1982).
286. Nakasheff, 89 F. Supp. at 90; see also 31 C.F.R. § 3.20 (1988).
287. 31 U.S.C. § 3723(a).
288. Id. § 3723(b).
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FTCA.2 89 Under regulations promulgated under the Act, claims are forwarded to the appropriate bureau's legal division for advice and recommendation.2 90 Thereafter, the claim is approved, disapproved, or compromised by the bureau head.29 1 Acceptance of the settlement by a
claimant is recognized as "complete satisfaction" of the claim.292
Despite its purpose and design, the effectiveness of the Small Claims
Act appears to be severely restricted. First, the $1,000 cap on recovery is
extremely outdated and thoroughly inappropriate. This level of settlement obviously was enacted in 1922. Hence, while the owner of a $50
perfume bottle, dropped during a customs inspection may find solace
under the Act, the owner of a $5,000 Swiss watch obviously will not.
Unlike the Small Claims Act, the comparable settlement provision under
the FTCA29 a has been consistently amended to reflect congressional attitudes towards governmental tort liability. Apparent from the disparity in
congressional concern between the settlement opportunities under the
FTCA and those under the Small Claims Act, is the fact that lawmakers
seem more concerned with increasing remedies for governmental torts
recognized over thirty years ago than remedying negligent government
actions challenged only four years ago in Kosak. In other words, settlement under the FTCA is altered for administrative as well as equitable
reasons. Hence, prior to the Supreme Court's finding that section
2680(c) bars claims against the Customs Service it was arguable that
FTCA settlement opportunities were available to the property owners in
Kosak29 4 and FormulaOne.2 95 Instead, based upon a disputed reading of
legislative history in Kosak, these same property owners are faced with
an opportunity for a $1,000 settlement under the Small Claims Act.
Second, the approval of a claim for settlement seems purely discretionary. The Government has no motive to waive its sovereign immunity. As

289. Id. § 3723(a)(2). To recover under 28 U.S.C. section 2672, a claimant must
show a valid claim under the FTCA. Since customs seizures and detentions have been
interpreted as falling under 28 U.S.C. section 2680(c)-an exception to the broad waiver
of immunity under the FTCA-this remedy is unavailable.

290. 31 C.F.R. § 3.22 (1988).
291. Id. § 3.23.
292. 31 U.S.C. § 3723(c) (1982). Until 1982, the agency had to report to Congress
for appropriations. Bermann, supra note 283, at 522. Today, settlements are paid out of

a judgment fund. 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982); Bermann, supra note 283, at 522. Judgments and other administrative settlements are also paid out of this fund. 31 U.S.C. §
1304.
293.
294.
295.

38 U.S.C. § 2672 (1982).
465 U.S. 848 (1984).
777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985).
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a result, the remedy is awarded purely as a matter of good will2" 6 or for
political reasons,297 in order to restore public trust in the Customs Service. Despite these weaknesses and given the unlikelihood of a judicial or
legislative remedy, the Small Claims Act may provide the only true avenue of recovery for property damaged by the Customs Service.
V.

CONCLUSION

Over the last seven years the role of the Customs Service has drastically changed. Traditionally a revenue raising agency, the Customs Service is now in the vanguard of narcotic and contraband enforcement. 98
To fulfill its new mission, the Customs Service devotes time and energy
to the development of high-technology surveillance and detection devices. 99 Following a detailed 1982 report on damage to property seized
pursuant to enforcement, the Customs Service and Congress have focused
efforts on increasing the value of seized items for purposes of sale or
further customs use. For instance, the Customs Service recently introduced a new concept in the custody, maintenance, and disposition of
seized and forfeited property."0 Further, the Customs Service has recently initiated a program designed to prevent the theft of detained property.301 Despite these advancements, the owner of goods imported or
searched at the border remains without a remedy for property that is
damaged or lost while in Customs Service custody.
To a large extent, the Supreme Court in Kosak foreclosed the possibility of judicial remedies against the Government for property damage.
296. Bermann, supra 283, at 522.
297. Telephone interview with Lawrence W. Hanson, Assistant Regional Counsel,
United Stated Customs Service, North Central Region (March 2, 1989).
298. See generally CusToMs U.S.A., supra note 2; MIsSIoN, supra note 3; Accomplishments, supra note 6.
299. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 6, at 9 (use of high-technology Automated
Commercial Systems to provide inspectors with information to increase the efficiency of
searches and seizures).
300. See HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at iii, app. B. The Handbook provides guidelines for a new contractor program. This program is designed to allow the Customs
Service to contract with the private sector for services of storing and disposing of seized
property. Provision 4.5 of the Statement of Work, appended to the Handbook, outlines
the proper steps to be taken when goods are lost, damaged, or destroyed. Id. at app. B, §
4.5. Ironically, a clause in the guidelines holds the contractor and subcontractor liable for
just such an occasion. It remains to be seen whether a property owner could successfully
sue under a similar contract. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Michigan Warehouse Co., 219 Mich.
401, 189 N.W. 1 (1920) (bonded warehouseman liable for negligence when goods damaged while in his possession).
301. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 6, at 10.
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Though potentially available, recovery under the Tucker Act is largely
inadequate and limited to specific fact situations. Questionable authority
supports a limited recovery under the due process clause for depreciation
caused by a constitutionally infirm seizure, forfeiture, or subsequent
sale.302 Implied-in-fact contracts of bailment are severely restricted to situations, such as those in Alliance or Bielass, where the owner of the
goods can produce material evidence of a "tacit understanding" to contract.30 3 On the other hand, recent Supreme Court authority suggests
success under a "takings" analysis, provided that the owner is innocent
of wrongdoing and the court becomes more plaintiff-oriented in its "ad
hoc" approach.30 4 Similarly, the preemption of most common law tort
claims by the new Liability Reform Act may require judicially-relaxed
proof standards of in Bivens actions. This would allow a broader recovery against customs officials in their individual capacities. 0 5
Contrary authority, however, suggests that these remedial problems
and solutions are more appropriately addressed to Congress, and not to
the courts.30 6 While it is highly unlikely that the Legislature can remedy
this situation through enactment of private bills or congressional reference legislation, Congress may be able to effectuate a remedy through
adjustments to the administrative settlement process. A modest increase
in settlement amounts under the Small Claims Act, accompanied by
stricter proof standards similar to those accompanying the abatement and
refund scheme,307 would serve to curtail excessive and fraudulent claims
thereby reducing litigation costs, while at the same time increasing the
political posture and support for Customs Service enforcement activities.
Most important, the innocent victim of property damage is partially if
not fully compensated.
As threats to the nation's security and welfare increase, so do the responsibilities of the Customs Service.30 " Customs is rightfully encouraged
to conduct a greater number and more extensive searches of commercially shipped imports and goods carried across the border. With the
ever-increasing activity of the Customs Service in mind, Congress and
the judiciary should be reminded that "it is as much the duty of Govern-

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

308.

See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II, B, 2.
See supra notes 83-117 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II, C.
See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 862 (1984).
See 19 C.F.R. §§ 158.21-.30; supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
See ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 6, at 1.
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ment to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to
administer the same between private individuals." ' 9
Ronald L. Cornell,Jr.

309.

Abraham Lincoln's First Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1861,

CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. iv, app. at 2 (1862).

